Working Papers
"Less is more? Limits to itemized deductions and tax evasion" (Job Market Paper) "Financial literacy among high school students in the United States: Evidence from the 2012 Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA)" with Annamaria Lusardi Works In Progress "Willing but unable to pay? The role of gender in tax compliance" with Carlos Scartascini "When the taxman shutters the store next door" "Measuring income tax evasion using electronic billing" with Angelica Trujillo and Nestor Villacres Deductions for personal expenses often feature thresholds above which additional documentation is needed. These itemizing thresholds have two well-established roles: adding a non-monetary cost to the extra tax benefit, and transferring the burden of proof of the accuracy of the deduction to the taxpayer. Both roles suggest that the imposition of deduction thresholds should increase reported tax liability. This paper documents for the first time the existence of an additional role for the threshold of itemizing rules: disclosing information about the tax authority's audit procedures. If deduction thresholds change individuals' perceptions about enforcement rules, the effect on reported tax liability is uncertain. I show in a simple conceptual framework how the introduction of an itemizing rule could increase reported deductions, which could lead to a decrease in reported tax liability. To test the hypothesis, I use a natural experiment in Ecuador, where an itemizing rule was implemented retroactively. Several months after the fiscal year was over and tax returns had been submitted, the tax authority required itemization of personal expenses for people who had made a deduction over $7,500, without changing the tax. A relatively large portion of taxpayers amended their income tax returns after the change in the deduction rules. I observe a substantial increase in the deductions reported under the itemizing threshold, so the overall effect of the reform was a decrease in reported tax liability.
Awards and Scholarships
"Compliance spillovers across taxes: The role of penalties and detection" with Carlos Scartascini. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 164, p518-534, Aug 2019
When the tax authority increases the enforcement for one tax, what happens to the level of compliance in other taxes (spillover effect)? In this paper, we present a simple analytical model that shows that the sign of the spillover depends on how taxpayers update their beliefs about penalties and detection probabilities for one tax after observing the deterrence actions the tax agency takes for another tax. As a result, when spillovers are present, penalties and detection may not necessarily be interchangeable policy tools. We evaluate the sign of the spillover in the context of a randomized field experiment in a municipality in Argentina in a sample of about 700 taxpayers who are liable for both the property and gross-sales taxes. The evidence from the intervention indicates that the spillover from a message that increases the salience of penalties and enforcement for the property tax on the declaration in the gross-sales tax is positive. Those in the treatment group increase their reported tax by two percentage points more than the control group. This result has ample implications for researchers bringing interventions to the field and for governments' enforcement strategies.
"Pollution or crime: The effect of driving restrictions on criminal activity" with Paul E. Carrillo and Arun S. Malik. Journal of Public Economics 164, p50-69, Aug 2018
Driving restriction programs have been implemented in many cities around the world to alleviate pollution and congestion problems. Enforcement of such programs is costly and can potentially displace policing resources used for crime prevention and crime detection. Hence, driving restrictions may increase crime. To test this hypothesis, we exploit both temporal and spatial variation in the implementation of Quito, Ecuador's Pico y Placa program, and evaluate its effect on crime. Both difference-in-differences and spatial regression discontinuity estimates provide credible evidence that driving restrictions have increased crime rates.
